Beyond Russell’s Formula: A Critical Reassessment of Rousseau and Locke’s Influence on Hitler, Roosevelt, and Churchill

In A History of Western Philosophy,¹ Bertrand Russell famously claimed that “Hitler is an outcome of Rousseau; Roosevelt and Churchill of Locke.” At first glance, this statement assigns historical responsibility to two Enlightenment philosophers for shaping the moral and political landscapes of the 20th century. Yet such a linkage demands closer scrutiny. Hitler was less a direct outcome of Rousseau than a misinterpretation of Nietzsche. Roosevelt and Churchill share a similar ideology that mostly coincides with Locke’s philosophy. Roosevelt made adjustments to Lockean ideals by practising positive liberties, and Churchill engaged in imperialism that goes against Lockean principles but aligns with Locke’s personal choices. Meanwhile, Russell’s biases as a result of his context also influenced his limited interpretation.

We will first examine the quote itself, analysing the misattribution of Rousseau to Hitler, Roosevelt’s extension of Locke’s principles, and Churchill’s almost verbatim adherence to Locke, before moving on to investigate Russell’s context and how it influenced his stance.

Russell’s attribution of Rousseau’s philosophy to Hitler was a generalisation and misrepresentation. The most obvious contention is Rousseau’s idea of the General Will and that individuals should adhere to a collective will aimed at the common good.² Freedom was obedience to a law one has prescribed for oneself. Individuals must be compelled to follow the General Will for freedom to endure. An ideal society would be one where people were “forced to be free.” Individuals can only discern the General Will through direct deliberation, which is lacking in representative governments. Rousseau rejects representative governments in favour of direct participation and enacting policy through elective aristocracy: the Sovereignty of the People.³

Drawing parallels between Rousseau’s political philosophy and Hitler’s actions can be tempting. Hitler ascended to power through the votes of the German people. The emergence of the National Socialist Party as the largest party allowed Hitler to become Chancellor; this was a direct result of the democratic principles of the Weimar Republic. Following his appointment, Hitler merged the offices of Chancellor and President, becoming de facto dictator.⁴ One could argue that German voters, by electing Hitler into power, imposed upon themselves a General Will soon to be enforced by the aristocratic elite of Hitler and his inner circle. Therefore, they were indeed “forced” to be free after Hitler consolidated power and restricted civil liberties.

However, the alignment between Hitler’s actions and Rousseau’s philosophy is minimal. Hitler was a pragmatist, acting in the most advantageous way to consolidate power. He had always made clear, from his days in a Bavarian prison writing Mein Kampf⁵ to his final moments in the Berlin bunker,⁶ that he held a disdain for democracy, instead placing his faith in the Führerprinzip—a political hierarchy where absolute power resides in one strong leader. During Hitler’s rise to power, democratic principles were merely a means to an end, an end that led to the demise of those very principles.

The more jarring difference between Rousseau and Hitler lies in the racial policies of the National Socialist movement, which were equally, if not more important than, their political ideology. Rousseau had never indicated that racial superiority was a commendable policy.⁷

The same contradictions exist regarding Hitler’s economic policies. While Rousseau criticised liberal capitalism and attributed inequality to property ownership and class division,⁸ this view circulated among socialists and communists, whom Hitler opposed. Nazi Germany’s economic structure was more akin to a statist, autarkic corporatist or oligarchic state existing primarily for the waging of war, with labour unions outlawed and industrial elites such as IG-Farben and Krupp becoming major political influencers.⁹

The next question readily presents itself: Who, then, if not Rousseau, influenced Hitler? If we must identify one philosopher, it would be Nietzsche. Nietzsche believed in the Übermensch (“Superman”)—someone who creates their values and transcends conventional morality.¹⁰ Central to his belief was the idea of the Will to Power, a drive in all life to grow and overcome challenges.¹¹ Hitler appropriated these ideas to lend his regime a veneer of legitimacy, visiting Nietzsche’s archives in 1934 and maintaining a close relationship with Nietzsche’s sister Elisabeth.¹² Gradually, Hitler transformed the Übermensch into a racial idol and the Will to Power into a justification for authoritarianism. The National Socialists’ selective usage of Nietzsche’s ideas ignored his suspicion of the state and condemnation of antisemitism to exploit the name of a respected German philosopher. Hitler was more a pragmatist than someone who followed a certain philosophical dogma. His worldview was built from his experiences on the fronts of World War I, mingling at political meetings, and the “bitter loser” sentiments shared by most Germans at the time, representing a patchwork of Social Darwinism, Pan-German nationalism, and antisemitism rather than the coherent philosophy of any particular thinker.

On the other hand, Locke’s association with Roosevelt is more straightforward. Most of his political ideology and policies were either the result of or an extension of Locke’s arguments. Locke believed that individuals were born with the natural rights of life, liberty, and property, and that it was the government's duty to protect these rights.¹³ He was also a proponent of the social contract, where individuals consent to form a government by relinquishing certain freedoms for the protection of their rights. Roosevelt served as a defender of democracy and popular participation in a polarised world troubled by fascism and communism.

Roosevelt was raised and entered a political career influenced by Lockean philosophy and classical liberalism. In 1931, as governor of New York, he persuaded the Republican-controlled legislature to establish the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration, which offered unemployment benefits to 10 per cent of New York families.¹⁴ All these actions reflect his unwavering belief in the Social Contract and the obligations public officials have to improve the conditions of their constituents. It is also important to note his other influences: during his time at Harvard, he was inspired by his cousin, Theodore Roosevelt, who had advocated for progressive reforms.¹⁵ He was also influenced by his wife, Eleanor Roosevelt, who engaged in charitable work for the impoverished in New York and opened her husband’s eyes to the dire conditions in New York slums.¹⁶

It is important to recognise that while Locke advocated Negative Liberty (freedom from interference by others), Roosevelt believed in Positive Liberty (freedom to pursue a satisfactory livelihood). Between when he assumed office in 1933 until his death in 1945, Roosevelt made several adjustments to Locke’s notion of natural rights and advocacy for a minimal government role by adopting a more proactive approach in safeguarding natural rights, creating economic and social conditions that enabled genuine freedom, and granting privileges such as the right to work, housing, and security. Acting from experience and learning from the failures of the non-intervention policies set out by Herbert Hoover, this was a groundbreaking move that managed to save the nation. It can be easy to see disparities between Roosevelt’s policies and what Locke advocated, as a few were deemed unconstitutional. These included the National Industrial Recovery Act, which granted the executive branch excessive legislative power, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which breached the Tenth Amendment.¹⁷ Roosevelt overstepped in several areas and extended federal reach to a point that was controversial in the face of classical Lockean thought. Yet the second round of New Deal policies saw less backlash, indicating that most were aware of the benefits of extending Lockean thought. Roosevelt’s policies could be more accurately described as an evolution of Locke’s principles, signifying a shift from classical liberalism to modern liberalism to fit the circumstances of the times.

Like Roosevelt, Churchill was also a defender of Lockean ideals. Though Churchill was brought up following the Anglican faith, he expressed in a letter that he preferred Protestantism over Roman Catholicism because he felt it “a step nearer Reason”¹⁸—aligning himself both with the Protestant beliefs and trust in reason of Locke. Churchill has been described by his biographers as a fundamental conservative with a liberal outlook.¹⁹ Despite frequent changes in party affiliation during his political career, he was fully subscribed to Locke’s ideas of a limited government. He was staunchly anti-socialist due to the movement’s advocacy for government intervention in the market, and opposed the conservatives’ promotion of protectionism, leading to his first defection to the Liberal Party in 1904. He was a firm believer in the English parliamentary democracy stemming from the Glorious Revolution, as he led his nation throughout the war against fascism.

Unfortunately, unlike Roosevelt, Churchill also inherited many of Locke’s mistakes, especially concerning colonialism and imperialism. Locke had invested in the Royal African Company,²⁰ which traded enslaved Africans, and helped draft the 1669 Constitution of Carolina,²¹ which permitted hereditary nobility and slavery. Similar to Locke, Churchill preached principles of freedom and equality, but at the same time was also an ardent imperialist in practice. Churchill’s response to the Bengal famine was criticised by contemporaries as insufficient. In his private remarks made to Secretary for India Leo Amery, Churchill concluded aid would be pointless because “Indians [were] breeding like rabbits.”²² Churchill saw British Imperialism as a form of altruism, viewing the devolution of powers to Commonwealth members as irrational. This is manifested in his opposition to the Government of India Act of 1935 and his dislike of Mahatma Gandhi.²³ While these views may seem to contradict Lockean values of freedom and self-determination, it is more apt to say that Churchill inherited Locke’s ideals but also shared in his blind spots. Both failed to consistently uphold their beliefs, instead reverting to a more pragmatic approach as the situation suited them.

Having established many inconsistencies between the philosophers and the political leaders, we must question Russel’s credibility and motivations while writing this.

Russell appears to place significant emphasis on the supposed incompatibility between the democratic philosophies of Rousseau and Locke. In A History of Western Philosophy, he opens his chapter on Rousseau by drawing a contrast between the two thinkers, concluding that they “saw no compatibility.” Immediately following this statement, he introduces the claim mentioned in the prompt.²⁴ Indeed, Locke and Rousseau diverged fundamentally in their ideas of democracy. Yet, while the ideologies of Hitler on one hand and Roosevelt and Churchill on the other were starkly opposed—much like those of Rousseau and Locke—it would be a logical error to infer a causal relationship based on this contrast alone. The observant reader also notices that Russell wrote the book during World War II and published it soon after it ended. Thus, Russell simply did not possess the historical resources to formulate such a conclusion. More importantly, he lacked the benefit of hindsight, with many historians considering 10-20 years a required time to elapse between the time of the event and the time of analysis for accurate historical research.²⁵ Much of the material concerning Nazi Germany was scattered around the world and took decades until historians could analyze them. Many government documents in the US and the UK were not declassified until years later. Much of the commentaries of the time, including those by Hayek,²⁶ Druker,²⁷ and Nisbet,²⁸ shared similar opinions to Russell, also working with limited historical resources. In contrast, much of the work published several decades after World War II, such as that by Birzer²⁹ and Wokler,³⁰ offered opposing views, especially concerning Russell’s interpretation of Rousseau’s influence on Hitler. In this light, Russell’s sweeping assertion may be better seen as a rhetorical flourish rather than a rigorously argued position grounded in historical or philosophical analysis.

Ultimately, Russell’s assertion is more of a rhetorical provocation influenced by the historical context in which he wrote than a precise genealogical assertion. The statement is best understood as an invitation to investigate how ideas can be interpreted or distorted by context rather than as a definitive mapping of Enlightenment thought onto leadership in the 20th century. History rarely follows neat philosophical lines; rather, it reflects the messiness of human actions and the distortions of time. Reading Russell’s assertion as history runs the risk of being oversimplified; reading it critically marks the start of the actual historical process.

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